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THE STORY OF WORKIEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS
IN KENTUCKY
By E. G. TrimbleTBE LAw oF 1914
The efforts of Kentucky to secure a satisfactory workmen's
compensation law began in 1912 when Governor James B.
McCreary, in his message to the General Assembly, recommended
the enactment of such a Jaw' No law was passed, however, at
that session of the legislature..
The Governor again recommended such a law in his message
of January 6, 1914. He called the attention of the legislature,
which was Democratic, to the party's state platform which
declared.
"We favor the enactment of wise laws for the protection from accidents and injuries of all laborers engaged in hazardous employments, and we favor wise

and conservative laws regulating the arbitration of
labor strikes and disputes."

The Governor continued.
"The principle, that the cost of industrial accidents
must be charged to the industries causing them or
owners thereof, and not be permitted to fall entirely
upon the unfortunate workers, who are injured, has
been recognized in many States.
"I recommend that the subject of workmen's compensation for injuries while they are actually laboring,
be carefully
examined and a wise and just law en2
acted."

The legislature responded in March 1914 by enacting the
first workmen's compensation law for the state.' The purpose
*Professor of Political Science, University of Kentucky. Member, Kentucky State Bar Association. A.B., Berea College; Ph.D.,
Yale University.

'Message of James B. McCreary, Governor of Kentucky, to the
General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, January 2,

1912, p. 39.

Message of James B. McCreary, Governor of Kentucky, to the
General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, January 6,

1914, pp. 26, 56-57.
'Thum's

4880-4954.

Supplement to Kentucky Statutes of 1909,

Secs.
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of the law, as indicated by Governor McCreary, was to place
upon the industries causing them or the owners thereof "the
cost of industrial accidents" and not permit them "to fall
entirely on the unfortunate workers." The effect of the law for
those who elected to operate under it would be to supersede
the common law relationship between employers and employees
in regard to responsibility for injuries to workers, and to
substitute the schedule of compensation contained in the law
for various kinds of accidents.'
The act created a Compensation Board consisting of the,
Attorney General, the Commissioner of Insurance, and the Commissioner of Agriculture, Labor and Statistics. It created also
a workmen's compensation fund maintained by the employers
covered by the act. The fund was raised by a rate or premnum,
during the first year after the act took effect, of not to exceed
$1.25 on each $100.00 of the gross annual payroll of each employer covered by the act. The Board had charge of the fund
and could increase the rate if it deemed it necessary
It was made the duty of each employer to report to the
Board his place of business, the number of employees, the
amount of his payroll, and such other information as the Board
required, on blanks furnished by the Board.
Section 29 of the act provided that any employee subject
to the act could contract with his employer, if his employer
elected to pay the premiums provided in the law, to accept the
compensations provided by the act for injured employees in
lieu of any cause of action which he or is representative might
have, arising from negligence of his employer or his agents, and
to waive all causes of action against his employer conferred by
the constitution or statutes of Kentucky, or by common law, for
his injury or death. The law designated those occupations which
were covered by it, and all persons, firms, and corporations
Tegularly employing six or more persons for profit in carrying
.on any of the classes of business so designated were eligible to
-come under it. Election to come under the law was supposed,
4Robmson-Pettet Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Board et al.,
:201 Xy 719, 258 S.W 318 (1924)
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however, to be voluntary on the part of both the employer and
employee.
Section 30 provided that such a contract between an employee and employer would be presumed to have been made n
every case where an employer had chosen to pay into the fund,
if such employee continued to work for the employer after
notice that the employer had paid into the fund. Posting of
notices by the employer that he had chosen to pay into the fund
was to be considered sufficient notice to his employee, and the
continuance in the employer's service by the employee after
notices were posted was to be considered a waiver by the employee of his right of action, except as provided in section 32.
Section 32 provided that any employee before receiving an
injury might give notice to his employer, who had elected to pay
into the fund, that he would not accept the benefit of the act and
waive his right of action as provided by the act. Such notice was
to be served on the employer in writing and a copy sent to the
Compensation Board. If, after giving such notice, the employee
should be killed or injured while in the service of an employer
and an action was brought against the employer for damages,
the employer could defeat the action if
"The injury of said employee was caused by or
contributed to by the negligence of any other employee
of said employer, or if the injury was due to any of the
ordinary hazards, or risks of the employment, or if due
to any defect in the tools, machinery, appliances, instrumentality or place of work, if the defect was known
or could have been discovered by the injured employee
by the exercise of ordinary care on his part, or was not
known or could not have been discovered by the employer by the exercise of ordinary care in time to have
prevented the injury nor in any event, if the negligence
of the injured employee contributed to such injuries."

Section 34 provided that an employer who did not choose to
operate under the act and pay into the compensation fund could
not, in a suit against him for damages for injury of an employee,
"avail himself of the following defenses. The defense of the
fellow servant, the defense of the assumption of risk, or the defense of contributory negligence."
It will thus be seen that even though in theory the law was
voluntary on the part of both the employer and employee, in
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the sense that either could or not operate under the law as he
saw fit, should either party choose not to operate under the law,
he would be deprived of some supposed legal advantage if he
went to court to protect his rights.
The law was immediately tested in the courts in the case of
Kentucky State Journal Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Boardu
and was declared to be compulsory rather than voluntary and
thus unconstitutional.
In this case the company refused to fill out and return to
the Board the blanks furnished by the Board winch called for
certain information. The Board, represented by Attorney General James Garnett, and Assistant Attorney General Robert
Caldwell, asked the lower court to order the company to fill out
and return the blanks. The company, represented by attorneys
Brown and Nuckols, of Frankfort, and Charles Carroll, Elmer
C. Underwood, and W Pratt Dale, of Louisville, argued that the
law was unconstitutional for the following reasons
First The law was said to violate section 54 of the state
constitution which reads as follows
"The General Assembly shall have no power to
limit the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting
in death, or for injuries to person or property."
Second The law was said to be compulsory on both the employer and the employee and for that reason deprived the employer of its property without due process of law contrary to section 54 of the constitution quoted above.
Third The law was alleged to have conferred upon the
Board judicial powers contrary to sections 109 and 135 of the
constitution. (This argument was not discussed in the Court's
opinion.)
Fourth The act was said to be in contravention of section
241 of the constitution, which reads as follows
"Whenever the death of a person shall result from
an injury inflicted by negligence or wrongful act, then,
in every such case, damages may be recovered for such
death, from the corporations and persons so causing
the same. Until otherwise provided by law, the action
to recover such damages shall in all cases be prosecuted
by the personal representative of the deceased person.
The General Assembly may provide how the recovery
161 Ky 562, 170 S.W 1166 (1914).
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shall go and to whom belong; and until such provision
is made, the same shall form part of-the personal estate
of the deceased person."

The opinion of the Court was written by Special Judge
Dorsey (with Chief Justice Hobson, and Justices Miller and
Lassing dissenting) It held that, since section 29 of the act
permitted an employee working for an employer who was oper
ating under the act to contract with such employer to accept
the compensation provided by the act in case of injury in lieu
of any other cause of action for such injury, the section did constitute a limitation on the "amount" of recovery under section
We tink
54 of the constitution. However, the Court said, "
it is within the power and right of an employee to waive this
limit of recovery for injury, by contract, if such contract is
freely and voluntarily made. "6
The Court then pointed out that under section 30 -of the
act an employee was presumed to have agreed to- come under the
act if he continued to work for an employer who had chosen to
operate under the law and who had posted notices in his shop to
that effect. "There may never have been a word or a syllable
between the employer and the employee in regard to a contract
7
for employment to labor
," said the Court. Just what significance it attached to this fact is not made clear. The Court
did not indicate whether or not this fact had any material bearing on the question of constitutionality The implication seemed
to be that it did.
It then took up section 32 of the law -which purported to
give the employer who elected to operate under the law the common law defenses if he were sued by one of his injured employees who had elected not to operate under the law. Giving these
defenses to the employer, said the Court, constituted not only
limitations on the "amount" an employee could recover within
the meaning of section 54 of the constitution, "but practically
destroys his right to recovery " "When the employer accepts
the provisions of this act," it said, "the employee is automatiupon pam of being
cally drawn into this so-called contract
deprived of all his causes of actions." Why should he be so
"Id. 170 S.W at 1168.
Ibid.
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penalized, the Court asked, and answered by saying- "It was
the purpose and intent of this act to compel an employee to
accept its provisions and take the compensation allowed by the
board in lieu of any cause of action he might have against his
.emplover for his injuries." Tins prevented the employee's act
from being voluntary "His election should be free, not even m
the alternative" said the Court. It continued "The Legislature
has no right to say to one of its citizens that
'Unless you accept the provisions of a law impairing your constitutional rights, it will take from you
other rights more valuable.'

In the light of section 54 of the Constitution, we must treat the
contract made by the employee under the provision of this act
,as compulsory, and therefore void."s

Turning to the effect on the employer who failed to accept
the law, the Court said that, since under section 34 of the act
he was deprived of the defenses of the fellow-servant, the as:sumption of risk, and the contributory negligence rules, the law
an effect said to him.
"'You may refuse to accept the provisions of this
act, but if any suit is instituted against you for injuries
received by your employees, you are deprived of all
defenses thereto, and to all intents and purposes a default judgment will be rendered against you.'
*We cannot subscribe to the proposition, that this is a voluntary

,contract, even on the part of the employer. '" 9 It did not say
specifically but implied that this also made the law invalid,
presumably on the theory that it deprived the employer of his
property without due process of law, as was argued by counsel.
The Court then considered sections 42 and 43 of the law in
connection with section 241 of the constitution. Section 42 of the
act provided that no one should be considered a dependent except a member of the deceased person's family or a widow,
-widower, lineal descendant, ancestor, or brother or sister. If a
deceased employee had no dependents, the disbursements from
the compensation fund were limited to medical and funeral expenses, and the Board had the sole right of action to recover
from the employer. Section 43 provided that no one except
S Id. 170 S.W at 1169.
9

Ibid.
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dependents of a deceased should receive any benefit from the
fund, and if there were no dependents the amount recovered.
from an employer should be paid into the compensation fund
for the benefit of the class to which such employee belonged.
Section 241 of the constitution gives the personal representative of a deceased employee the right to recover damages from
the negligent person or corporation causing his death. This.
right, the Court said, was an "absolute right" given the personal
representative and it was immaterial "whether the money recovered goes to the children or parents, or becomes a part of his
personal estate." It seemed clear to the court that the part of
the act taking from the personal representative or estate of a
deceased employee who had no dependent any part of the compensation due him and directing its payment into this find for
the benefit of other people was a violation of this section of the
constitution. "The Legislature," the Court continued, "has no.
right to limit the damages recovered, for the death of an employee negligently killed, to his dependents." Nor could the
Legislature "take what is due the estate of one man and give
it to another,"" the Court said, as the act purported to do in
permitting the Board to recover from the employer for the
negligent death of an employee without dependents and to use
the money for other employees.
The Court went on to say that it was within the police power
of the state legislature to pass a workmen's compensation law.
free from the objectionable features of this act and that the
Court looked with great favor upon such a law, but that "thi
court cannot consent that the Legislature has the power to put
this Compensation Act in operation by means of compulsory
contracts. ' I
In discussing court decisions upholding similar laws in
other states, the Court pointed out that in none of these states
was there a constitutional provision similar to section 54 of the
Kentucky constitution which denied to the legislature the
"power to limit the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to person or property"
° Id. 170 S.W at 1170.
'Id. 170 S.W at 1171.
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Summarizing the opinion, it can be said that the law was
held unconstitutional because it violated two provisions of the
constitution
First, it violated section 54 of the constitution because it
limited by a compulsory contract the amount of recovery for the
wrongful death of an employee to the amount specified m the
law. It is clear that it was the so-called compulsory nature of
the contract that made the law bad.
Second, by implication section 54 was held to be violated because the law was compulsory on the employer and hence demed
him due process of law.
Third, it violated section 241 of the constitution by attempting to restrict the right of recovery for the wrongful death of an
.employee to his dependents and barring his personal representative and estate. It violated section 241 also by permitting the
Compensation Board to recover from an employer for the
wrongful death of an employee without dependents, and by providing that the amount recovered be paid into the compensation
fund for other employees of the same class. (As will appear, the
section of the opinion dealing with compulsion on the employer
was repudiated by the Court in its opinion rejecting a petition
for reargument of the case.)
Justice Shackelford Miller, for himself and for Chief Justice
H-obson and Justice Lassing, wrote a long dissenting opinion
takine the position that the law was voluntary on the part of
both the employee and the employer because either party could
refuse to operate under it. He pointed out that the law merely
took from an employer who refused to operate under it his
common law defenses if lie were sued by an employee for injury,
and saved for the employer those defenses if he accepted the law
but his employee did not. This opinion referred to the fact that
laws containing elective features substantially like the Kentucky
statute had been expressly upheld in Wisconsin, Ohio, Massachusetts, and Minnesota, while Washington and Montana had
sustained laws which were admittedly compulsory The dissent
said that the argument was not met by saying that the Kentucky constitution had sections 54 and 241 in it while there
were no similar provisions in the constitutions of the other
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states. The essential question was, Justice M1iller said, whether
the ]aw was elective or compulsory, and pointed out that in all
of the states above-mentioned the courts considered such a law
elective and not compulsory
A petition for a reargument of the ease was soon filed, and
in a subsequent opinion denying the petition, the Court, again
speaking through Special Judge Dorsey, clarified its original
opinion and made suggestions for changes in the law which presumably would make it more acceptable. It clarified its original
opinion by saying that
"First: The provisions of the present compensation

act, as far as they affect the employer, are unobjectionable, as they do not conflict with any provisions of the
Constitution.
"Second: Any employee coming within the provisions of the act may voluntarily agree to accept its provisions fixing and limiting his recovery in case of injury.
"Third: He may likewise voluntarily accept the
provisions of the act fixing the amount that shall be
recovered in the event of his death, and said sum should
be paid to his dependents, if he leaves any, and, if not,
to his personal representative. The Legislature has no
power to direct that this sum shall in any event be paid
into the compensation fund.
"Fourth: Some provision should be made in the
act whereby the employee signifies his acceptance of
the provisions of the act by some affirmative act on his
part. Silence on this subject should not be construed
into acceptance.
"Fifth: Provision should be made in the act for
appeal to a court of competent jurisdiction for review
in all cases where compensation is denied or where a
less sum is allowed by 2 the board than that claimed by
the injured employee.'
This eliminated the contention that the law was unconstitutional because it coerced the employer. This opinion, however,
.did not alter the original holding that the law was unconstitutional because it was compulsory on the employee, and it reaffirmed the Court's previous position that the legislature has
no power to restrict recovery to an employee's dependents or to
direct that the sum recovered be paid into the compensation
fund.
"State Journal Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Board, 162 Ky.
387, 388, 172 S.W 674 (1915)
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Since the opinion in the original case has been considered
as having finally determined the constitutional law on the subject, it will merit close examination.
It should be pointed out here that no employee was complaining before the Court. An employer challenged the law and.
as to hin the law was said to be valid. The court therefore failed
to do what judicial bodies, including the U S. Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals 121 itself, generally do, that is, limit
itself to the facts before it. The Court went out of its way to
protect the rights of employees who had not complained.
Be that as it may, the holding of the Court that the law
violated section 54 of the constitution depends (since the second
opinion) entirely on the assumption that it coerced the employee.
It will be recalled that the Court considered the law compulsory
on the employee, although he could choose between continuingto operate at common law or coming under the act, whichever
course of action in his opinion was better calculated to promote
his interests. The Court said that he lost ls rights if he chose
not to come under the law, because the act, section 32, enabled
the employer to defeat an action by pleading in substance the
common law defenses. This constituted compulsion.
If it can be shown that these defenses were available to the
employer before the act was passed, then the act did not change
the legal status of the employee and, therefore, he cannot be said
to have been coerced.
What were these common law defenses which the act purportedly gave to the employer and which, since they were given,
destroyed the employee's rights9 They were in substance (1)
the rule of the fellow servant, (2) the rule of assumption of risk,
and (3) the rule of contributory negligence.
(1)
Fellow servant. The law in Kentucky on the fellow
servant rule was well set forth by the Court of Appeals in 1899
in the case of Linck's Adm'r v Louisville & N B. Co. when it
said
"Beginning with the case of Railroad Co. v Collins, 2 Duv. 118, this court, by a long and unbroken line
"a See, Erlanger Kennel Club et al. v Daugherty et al., 213 Ky
648, 281 S.W 826 (1926), Cumberland and Ohio R.R. Co. v Barren
County Court, 73 Ky 604 (1874)
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of decisions

has repeatedly held that where two

servants of the same master are equal

no recovery

can be had, as against the master, by one servant for
the negligence of the other."'

The above rule was followed in 1912 in the case of John
Hamnn g Distilling Co. v Nischan's Administrator when the
Court ruled that Nischan's administrator could not recover for
the death of Nischan, a servant of the Elanning Distilling Co.,
who was fatally injured while engaged in repairing a porch for

the company by a post being permitted to fall on him through
the negligence of men aiding him in repairing the porch. The
Court, in discussing the relation in which Nischan and his
helpers were working, said.
"1
they worked side by side, in the same common
work. That being true, they were
in the same department and the same grade thereof, and it therefore
follows that the negligence of each of the other laborers, so far as Nischan is concerned, was the negligence
of a fellow servant, and, that being true, he cannot re-

cover.""4

In

The Court of appeals, however, narrowed the rule somewhat.
1910 the Court explained that it had never adopted the fel-

low servant rule as this rule was applied in the -Massachusetts

courts, which regarded all employees of a common master engaged i

a common pursuit to be fellow servants. It stated that
"In this state two exceptions to this rule have been
recognized: First, where the servant is injured by the
gross negligence of another servant superior in authority to him; second, where the servant is injured by the
negligence of another servant in a different department
or grade of employment."'

A third exception to the fellow servant rule was laid down
by the Court of Appeals, after the adoption of the present constitution, in interpreting section 241 thereof."; According to
this exception, if an injury proved fatal to an employee, the
master was liable for the ordinary negligence of a superior
servant. There were, then, three qualifications of the fellow
servant rule in Kentucky
"107 Ky. 370, 54 S.W 184, 185 (1899)
"149 Ky 683, 149 S.W 994, 996 (1912).
Milton's Adm'x. v. Frankfort & V Traction Co., 139 Ky. 53,
129 S.W 322, 324 (1910).
"Linck's Adm'r. v Louisville & N. R. Co., 107 Ky. 370, 54 S.W
184 (1899).
L. J.-2
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Subject to these modifications, the fellow servant rule was
the law in Kentucky before the enactment of the compensation
act, and, presumably, was inteided by the legislature to remain
the law for those employees who did not elect to come under the
act. If this is correct, their failure to come under the act deprived them of no existing rights but only deprived them of any
advantages which the act offered. Such advantages as it did
offer, the employee had an opportunity, of course, to avail
himself of if he wished so to do.
This conclusion must follow unless it be assumed that the
legislature, by prohibiting recovery if an injury "was caused
by or contributed to by the negligence of any other employee of
said employer," intended to modify the two qualifications of
the fellow servant rule, as to non-fatal accidents, adopted by the
Kentucky Court and to enact the old Massachusetts fellow
servant rule which regarded all employees of a particular employer as fellow servants. (The exception as to fatal accidents
had a constitutional basis 1 and, presumably, the legislature
could not modify it.) It is submitted that it is highly improbable
that the legislature intended to repeal these two qualifications.
It does not seem probable that the members of the legislature
were familiar with the refinements of the fellow servant rule
as worked out by the Kentucky courts. It is more probable that
the legislature merely meant to assert that the employer could
defend himself in a damage suit by an injured employee not
operatiig under the law by pleading the fellow servant rule as
applied by the Kentucky courts, assuming that the Kentucky
courts had applied such rule in the orthodox sense. This view
would seem to be in harmony with the language of the remainder of section 32 which states in orthodox language the defenses
of assumption of risk and contributory negligence. This interpretation is supported,, also, by the fact that in section 34, where
the non-complying employer is denied the common law defenses,
these defenses are listed merely as "the defense of the fellow
servant the defense of the assumption of risk, or the defense of
contributory negligence."
"Constitution of Kentucky, sec. 241. See Linck's Adm'r. v.
Louisville & N. R. Co., supra note 16.
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It is significant, furthermore, that the Court of Appeals m
its long opinion does not indicate that it thought the legislature
meant to merely "reduce" the non-complying employee's rights
by abolishing the exceptions to the fellow servant rule. It speaks
of abolishing "all" of the employee's causes of action, as if the
compensation law were giving for the first time these common
law defenses to a complying employer whose employees were
non-complying.
(2) Assumption of risk. The common law rule that a
servant accepts the ordinary risks of employment and cannot
recover for an injury resulting therefrom has received frequent
sanction by the Court of Appeals. In the case of Mowrey v.
Frazzer.&Foster,the Court had before it a suit by the employee,
Mowrey, for damages for injury sustained while operating a
car to convey crushed rock over a temporary track from his
employer's quarry The tracks were not securely fastened and
the cars were derailed, injuring Mowrey The Court, in denying
recovery, said
'When an intelligent, experienced servant with full
knowledge of all the conditions undertakes an employment in a place that cannot be made safe or that is not
intended to be made safe, he accepts the risks of accident, ,,and injury that come in the course of his employment. '

The rule that an employee assumed the risk of injury as a
result of defective tools, machinery, dangerous place of work,
etc., which the compensation act permitted a complying employer to plead to defeat an action by a non-complying employee, was part of the rule of assumption of risk applied by the
Kentucky courts, and is closely related to the rule of contributory negligence. In the case of Mowrey v. Frazter and Foster,
cited above, the Court in its opinion pointed out that "the track
on which the cars ran was not intended to be either safely or
securely constructed, and this Mowrey could see and know,"
and that he knew the path on the side of the track where he
walked was rocky and thus dangerous. He could not, therefore,
"complain that he was not furinshed a reasonably safe place
in which to work."
' Mowrey v. Frazier and Foster, 120 S.W 289, 290 (1909)

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

In the case of Trosper v East Jellico Coal Co., the same rule
was applied with the additional feature of the employee's failure to exercise reasonable care. The Court demed recovery to an
employee who was hauling rails on a car in a mine and was injured when his head struck cross-beams which were not high
enough to enable him to walk upright under them. The Court
said
"While it is the duty of the master to furmsh the
servant a reasonably safe place in which to work, yet
the servant cannot recover if he knows of a danger,
and does not exercise ordinary care for his own
safety."'"
The same rule was applied again in Wiley v. Cincinnath,
N 0 & T P Ry. Co. which involved defective machinery The
emplovee was injured by a defective coupling with which he was
attempting to couple an engine and a car. After pointing out
that an employer is under duty to provide reasonably safe appliances for his employees to work with, the Court, in denying
recovery in this case, said.
"Confronted by this obviously dangerous condition,
the plaintiff, an experienced man, undertook, in the
ordinary course of his business, to make the coupling
in the manner we have stated, and in so doing, we
think, assumed
the risk of any injury that might happen
to him. '
(3)
Contributory negligence. As to the use of this defense, the rule in Kentucky was well settled. In 1910 the Court
of Appeals had before it a case in which the administratrix of
a streetcar motorman was suing the traction company for wrongful death resulting from the collision of the car driven by the
deceaqed with a car driven by another motorman. Both motormen were found to have been guilty of negligence, and the Court
ruled that the deceased motorman's negligence prevented recovery It said
"The rule is well settled that, where the injury
complained of was caused by his own negligence, it will
defeat a recovery although the person' committing the
injury may also have been negligent."
135 Ky 40, 122 S.W 205, 206 (1909)
161 Ky 305, 170 S.W 652, 655 (1914).

-' Milton's Adm'x. v Frankfort & V Traction Co., 139 Ky. 53,

129 S.W 322.
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The rule has been applied in many cases 2 2 including the

Wiley case mentioned above.
To summarize the law in Kentucky on the eve of the Court
of Appeals' decision declaring the workmen's compensation law
unconstitutional, it can be said that an employer was not liable
for an injury to a workman, whether fatal or not, if the injury
resulted from negligence of a fellow-servant, that is, by an employee of the same master, on a level with the injured workman
and directly associated with him in employment. An employer
was liable if a non-fatal injury resulted from gross negligence
cii the part of an employee superior to the one injured or from
ordinary negligence of an employee in another department of the
establishment. But if the injury was fatal, the employer, after
the adoption of the present constitution in 1892, was liable fQr
ordinary negligence of a superior employee.
Also, the employer could successfully plead contributory
negligence or assumption of ordinary risk of the employment ineluding defective machinery, as a defense in a damage suit by
one of his injured employees.
With these rules of law in mind, the statement of the Court
in the Kentucky State Journal case that, if a worker failed to
elect to operate under the workmen's compensation law, he lost
"all" of his common law causes of action because the employer
could plead the common law defenses seems somewhat meaningless. 2'3 Presumably, if he did not elect to come under the law,

his relation to his employer would be governed by the common
law rules as adopted by the Kentucky courts which are summarized above. In short, the act did vot give to the employer
who elected to operate under the law, but whose employees did
not, those common law defenses. He already had them. Consequently, the act did not take from the non-complying employee
Ellis' Adm'r. v. Louisville H. & St. L. Ry. Co., 155 Ky. 745, 160

S.W 512 (1913), Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Lumpkin, 136 Ky. 290, 124
S.W 318 (1910), Cincinnati N. 0. & T. P Ry Co. et al. v. Yocum's
Adm'r., 137 Ky. 117, 123 S.W 247 (1909)
2'See a thoughtful article by Robert T. Caldwell, The Workmen's
Compensation Situation in Kentucky (1916) 4 Ky. L. J. 4:1, in which
he interprets the Courts' position as meaning a "reduction" of the em,ployee's rights rather than a destruction of them. See also three good
articles on Workmen's Compensation Law by.Professor Roy Moreland
of the University of Kentucky Law School in 13 Ky. L. J. at 20, 94,
and 200.
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any common law right of action. (Unless, of course, it be assumed that the act did mean to repeal the exceptions to the
fellow-servant rule.) The employee, therefore, could not be said
to be coerced at all. In fact, the non-complying employer who
lost his common law defenses was the only party who was coerced. He was penalized if he chose not to come under the law,
although the Court in its second opinion said that this did not
violate any provision of the constitution. No doubt the Court
was correct in saying that this penalty did not make the law
invalid since an employer has no constitutional right to these
common law defenses. But that the act did penalize and, therefore, to some extent coerced the employer can hardly be questioned.
The part of the opinion dealing with section 241 of the
constitution raised a technical question of interpreting the meaning of that section. The act, in defining "dependents" of a deceahed employee restricted the term to members of the deceased
man's family or a widow, widower, lineal descendant, ancestor,
or brother or sister, and provided that no one except a dependent
could receive any benefit from the compensation fund, and if
there were no dependents the Board could collect the damages
which were to go into the fund. The Court said that the legislature had no right to limit the damages recovered to an employee's dependents and thus to deny a personal representative any
share therein. Section 241, however, expressly said that the
action for damages should be prosecuted by the personal representative "until otherwise provided by law." Yet the Court
said that this was an "absolute right" in the personal representative to prosecute the action for damages and it was thus
immaterial whether the damages recovered went to children or
parents or to the employee's personal estate. One may respectfully ask, what made the right of action m the personal representative an "absolute" right9 Clearly, it was absolute only
because a majority of the Court so decreed.
Further, the Court, m construing the section providing
that the damages recovered for the death of an employee with
no dependents should go into the compensation fund for other
employees, said that the legislature could not "take what is due
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the estate of one man and give it to another." But section 241
specifically states that "The General Assembly may provide how
the recovery shall go and to whom belong, and until such provision is made the same shall form part of the personal estate
of the deceased person." This language would seem to indicate
rather clearly that the framers of this section of the constitution
expected that the legislature might want to provide for such
matters and intended to leave it the authority so to do.
It is submitted that a careful reading of the decision will
lead one inevitably to the conclusion that there was operating
in the minds of the majority of the Court "an inarticulate major
premise," to use Justice Holmes' phrase, which made the law
unconstitutional. Yet, it has been assumed for three decades fhat
the decision tied the hands of the legislature in providing an
adequate worlunen's compensation law
The Court has in a number of cases since 191424 cited the
early decision, sometimes with express approval, but, except for
the petition for a reargument referred to above, it apparently
has never had occasion to reconsider the reasoning on
which the decision was based. In one of these cases, Ludwig
v. Johitson et al., in 1932, the Court had this to say about the
early opinion.
"In the Kentucky State Journal Company Case the
court, by implication, if not expressly, held that section
54 of the Constitution inhibited the Legislature from

taking away from an employee, without affording hun
the right of election to work under the act, his right to
recover damages for injuries resulting from the negligence of his employer. It might be argued'that the court
was not required to go that far in that case in order to
hold invalid the act there under consideration, but we
think the interpretation there given to section 54 of the
Constitution is sound."

"'PhilHollenbach Co. v. Hollenbach, 181 Ky. 262, 204 S.W 152

(1918), McCune v. Pell and Brother, 192 Ky. 22, 232 S.W 43 (1921)
Hoblitzel v. Jenkins, 204 Ky. 122, 263 S.W 764 (1924), Pioneer Coal
Co. v Polly, 208 Ky. 548, 271 S.W 592 (1925) Workmen's Compensation Board v. Abbott, 212 Ky. 123, 278 S.W 533 (1925), Wells Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Vanhoose et al., 220 Ky. 381, 295 S.W 464 (1927);
Whitney et al. v. Newbold, 270 Ky 209, 109 S.W 2d 406 (1937),
McClary et al. v McClary et al., 274 Ky. 299, 118 S. W 2d 687
(1938), Thomas et al. v. Crummies Creek Coal Co., 297 Ky. 210, 179
S.W 2d 882 (1944).
' 243 Ky. 533, 49 S.W 2d 347 (1932) at 350.
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This interpretation of section 54 of the constitution was no
doubt correct, for it would seem clear that in view of the language of the section the legislature would not be able to limit,
against his will, the amount that an injured workman could
recover. It is not necessarily true, however, that the interpretation there given of the act in question which made it conflict
with section 54 was sound, and the Court might well change
that interpretation. As will presently appear, the Court did, it
is believed, in passing upon the Act of 1916, depart from the
reasoning of the State Journal case.
THE LAW OF 1916
The legislature in 1916 passed the second workmen's compensation law which, with a number of amendments, is still the.
basic law of the state on the subject. This law in its fundamental
legal aspects was not essentially different from the law of 1914.
The composition of the Workmen's Compensation Board
under the 1916 law was different from that provided for by the
1914 law. Under the later law it was made up of three members
appointed by the Governor for four year terms. Every employer
subject to the act and who elected to come under it was required
by section 63 either to
"insure and keep insured his liability for compensation
hereunder in some corporation, association or orgarnzation authorized to transact the business of workmen's
compensation insurance in this State, or
furnish to
the board satisfactory proof of his financial ability to
pay direct the compensation m the amount and manner
and when due as provided for m this Act."
In the latter case the Board was to require the deposit of an
adequate security bond.
This law, also, purported to be elective on the part of both
the employer and employee, and section 73 provided a definite
form which each employer and employee who elected to come
under the act was to fill out and -sign. Thus a positive act was
required to indicate acceptance of the law.
Section 76a provided that employers who did not elect to
come under the law could not in any suit at law by an injured
employee plead in defense.
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"(1)
That the employee was guilty of contributory negligence.
(2)
That the injury was caused by the negligence
of a fellow-servant.
(3)
That the employee has assumed the risk of
injury."

Section 76b provided that employees who failed to come
under the law should bring their suits for damages against their
employers who had elected to operate under the act just "as if
this act had not been enacted," and the employer could avail
himself of the above defenses.

20

It will be noted that this law in its elective features was
substantially like the first law. The chief difference was that a
positive and formal act was required by both the employer and
employee to make known their election to accept the law.
This law was challenged on constitutional grounds and was
upheld by the Court of Appeals in 1916 in the case of Greene v.
Caldwell et al.-

The law was challenged on almost every conceivable ground,
only the most important of which need consideration here.
In the first place, it was argued that the law was compulsory on the employee in much the same way as was the law of
1914. It will be recalled that under the first law an employee
was presumed to have accepted the law if he continued to work
for an employer after the employer had posted notice that he
had accepted the law. Under the new law no such presumption
was created. On the contrary, the employee had to sign a written
statement that he had elected to come under the law. In considering this objection, the Court quoted from the decision invalidating the first law in which it was said that if an employer
accepted the law the employee was automatically drawn under
it. "He could," the Court said in the case under consideration,
''exercise no independent volition in the matter at all." '28 This
extreme statement of the position of the employee would seem
to be unwarranted, since he could avoid being brought under
the law merely by so notifying his employer. Furthermore, the
'The sections referred to above, 63, 73, 76a, and 76b are found
in Ky. STAT. (Carroll 1930), c. 137, sees. 4946, 4956, 4960, 4961, re.spectively.
170 Ky. 571, 186 S.W 648 (1916)
'AId. 186 S.W at 650.
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Court was hardly warranted m saying that this was "the chief
ground upon which the invalidity of the act was rested," '2 9 because the first opinion, as has been shown, did not make clear
just how significant was this presumption that the employee
desired to come under the law.
The Court then pointed out that under the present law no
one else could bring the employee under the law since he must
sign a statement indicating his desire to come under it.
The law itself is a sufficient answer," said the Court,
"to the argument that it is not an elective but a compulsory
",Yo It then pointed out that the fact that the emstatute.
ployer may rely on his common law defenses
"is far from denying to the employee the right to recover for injuries caused by the negligence of the employer. He still has his cause of action as he has always
had, and the employer has only the right to rely on defenses that he always had the right to rely on, although
it should be said that the common-law definition of
these defenses has been greatly modified by court
the employer
opinions and that they do not now excuse
to the full extent they formerly did."'
It concluded this part of its opinion by saying
"We may, however, say that we do not agree that
the changes in the existing law proposed in section 76b
have the coercive influence attributed to them by counsel, or that this section compels the employee to accept
the act when he would not' have accepted it if this
change had not been made."
It is submitted that the Court in saying that the law is not
coercive on the employee is by the same logic saying the law of
1914 was not coercive. The Court here recogmzes what the
Court failed to recognize in the State Journal case, that is, the
non-complying employee was not being coerced, because his
rights would remain substantially the same as they were before
the law was passed.
The fact that under the first law the employee was required to give written notice if he did not wish to come under
the law and under the second was required to give such notice
if he did wish to come under would seem to be a difference not
"Ibid.
Id. 186 S.W at 651.
Ibid.

Ibid.
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legally important. In either case, that is under both laws, the
employee was free to choose whether to come under the law or
not. It seems that the Court in Green v Caldwell actually
agreed with the- reasoning of the minority in the State Journal
case and was looking for a basis on winch to differ with the
majority without overruling the earlier decision. This basis it
found in the fact that the laws required slightly different behavior on the part of the employee.
Secondly, the law was challenged on the ground that it
violated section 54 of the constitution whichl denies to the General Assembly any power to limit the amount winch could be
recovered for injury The Court met this argument effectively
by saying
"But in this legislation the General Assembly did
not arbitrarily or at all undertake to limit the amount
of recovery. It merely proposed a statute to a certain
class of people for their individual acceptance or rejection. It did not assume to deprive these classes or
individuals without their consent of any constitutional
rights to which they were entitled."' 3

Thirdly, the law was challenged as depriving non-electin
employers of their property without due process of law, contrary to the 14th amendment of the Federal Constitution. To
this argument the Court, quite properly it is believed, replied
"The employer had no vested right in these defenses. The law gave them to him, and the law may
take them away, and it could have taken them away
without giving any election at all."''

In the remainder of the opinion, the Court held that the law
was not unconstitutional in providing that for injury to a minor
no one except the minor himself could recover, and that in the
event of the award of a lump sum of compensation to such minor
the payment should be to his guardian. In dealing with the
status of minors, the legislature was not restricted by any constitutional provision, said the Court.
As to the argument that the Board was a court, it ruled
again, as it did in the first case, that the Board was not a court
in the constitutional sense. Hence the law, in setting up the
Id. 186 S.W at 652.
"Id. 186 S.W at 653.
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Board, did not violate section 135 of the state constitution, wnch
prohibits the establishment of any court other than those provided for in the constitution. It pointed out that there was an
.appeal to the courts from the Board's decisions, as was recommended in the second opinion concerning the law of 1914.
The Court then considered and rejected in a few words
some minor objections to the law in regard to the defective title
.and denial of a jury trial before the Board. It also rejected the
.argument that it was special and class legislation, saying
"It is, however, so well settled as not to need citation of authority that the right of classification, when
reasonably exercised, is not opposed to either the state
or federal Constitution.
It is therefore only required
that the classification shall be as reasonable and just
as practicable as conditions will permit,' and this legislation we think conforms to this rule.
As was previously pointed out, the law of 1916, -ith a
numnber of amendments, is still on the statute books. In the
-course of time, large numbers of employers elected to come
under it and thus relieve themselves of possible liability in unlimited amounts to injured employees. The number so electing
has fluctuated from year to year. According to the Reports of
the
orkmen's Compensation Board, the number of employers
electing to operate under the law increased gradually from 4007
during the fiscal year 1916-1736 to approximately 19,349 as of
June 30. 1931.37 The number appears to have dropped to approximately 13,083 as of June 30, 1946.38
THE LA-ws op 1946
There was abundant evidence that the state needed a more
effecti-e law than that of 1916. The Legislature of 1946, therefore, attempted to meet the need. It passed two additional workmen's compensation laws. The first, Senate Bill 143, 39 a compulsorv law, passed March 6th, amended and reenacted certain
' Id. 186 S.W at 654.
Annual Report of Workmen's Compensation -Board,Kentucky,
1916-17.
"Annual Report of Workmen's Compensation Board, Kentucky,

-July 1, 1930 to June 30, 1931.

'Annual Report of the Department of Industrial Relations, Fis-

cal Year July 1, 1946 to June 30, 1947.
Kentucky Acts, 1946, c. 203; Ky. R. S. 342.005-342.009.
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parts of the old law and provided that "Every employer engaged in a business or occupation defined as 'hazardous employment' shall insure and keep insured his liability for said.
compensation in the manner and under the provisions of subsection (1) of section 342.340 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes
"40 Severe penalties were provided for employers who
failed to comply, including a fine of not more than $500.00 or
imprisonment for one year or both. Such employer was also deprived of his common law defenses in the event he was sued for
damages by one of his employees.
The second law, House Bill 201,4 1 passed MHarch 13, 1946,

commonly called the Financial Responsibility Act, provided that
every employer in the state engaged in hazardous employnment
and not excepted from the workmen's compensation law and who
elects not to operate under it
"
shall file with the Commissioner of Industrial
Relations, within thirty (30) days after this Act becomes effective or such employment is begun
a
good and sufficient security, indemnity bond or insurance policy issued by a surety or insurance company or
other insurance carrier authorized to transact such
business in this State, winch shall insure the payment
of any final judgment of a court of competent jurMisdiction obtained against such an employer by an employee
or his personal representative for damages resulting
from injuries to the person or death of such employee,
by accident' arising out of and in the course of his employment."
Section 4 of this Act provided severe penalties for violation
of the law.
It thus will be seen that the legislature at the same session
passed two laws which seem to be theoretically inconsistentthe first was compulsory and the second permitted employers
to continue to operate at common law but imposed an additional
requirement on such employers. Employers to whom the second
law was applicable, of course, retained their common law defenses but were liable for unlimited damages.
A case was soon brought to determine the legal effect of
the two laws. The Court of Appeals considered the legal -questions involved in the case of Sumpter v Burchett, as Common'Kentucky
Acts, 1946, c. 203, sec. 1 (2)a, p. 552.
4" Kentucky Acts, 1946, c. 61, Ky. R. S. 342.016, 342.017.
'Kentucky Acts, 1946, c. 61, sec. 1, p. 151.
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wealth's Attorney, et al.4 3 The appellant, operator of a lumber
yard, a hazardous occupation, brought the action askiug for a
declaration of his rights and alleging that he wished to carry
on his business at common law, that is, without complying with
the workmen's compensation law, but that he was willing to comply with House Bill 201 which required the posting of security
bond with the Commissioner of Industrial Relations. If he
adopted this course of action, however, he would run afoul of the
compulsory act. The compulsory act, he argued, was unconstitutional. The Court, in disposing of the case, did not find it necessary to pass on the constitutionality of the compulsory law.
It found that the second law passed by the legislature, House
Bill 201. had repealed the compulsory law. Speaking through
Judge Dawson, a special judge, the Court pointed out that two
or more acts dealing with the same subject must be reconciled
if possible so as to give effect to both, but that if "two acts are
irreconcilable the last enacted must prevail." The irreconcilability of the two acts, Judge Dawson said, could not be doubted.
He continued.
"Under the law first enacted the employer would be
compelled, under drastic criminal penalties, to accept
and operate under the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, and forbidden to continue operating
at common law. Under the last enacted statute the employer is permitted to reject the Workmen's Compensation Act and operate at common law, but required to

furnish financial security for common law judgments.
Manifestly an employer cannot operate under both. If
he elects to operate under House Bill No. 201, he would
be in direct violation of Senate Bill No. 143, and subject to criminal penalties. If Senate Bill No. 143 is
valid, House Bill No. 201 falls by its own weight The
result is that both acts cannot stand, and in such a
situation the law last enacted must be regarded as the
final expression
of the legislative will and permitted to
prevail."4

Since the compulsory law amended part of the old workmen's compensation act, a question was raised as to the effect of
the repeal of the former. Judge Dawson held "that the repeal
of the amending act simply left the law as it was before the
amending act was passed.' 5 The second act, House Bill 201, was
S304 Ky 858, 202 S.W 2d 735 (1947)
"Id. 304 Ky at 862.
Ibid.
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held, therefore, to add to the existing workmen's compensation
act "the requirements which insure payment of common law
judgments in favor of employees on account of accidents arising
out of and in the course of their employment. "4
The employers engaged in hazardous occupations, therefore, now have a choice of coming nuder the old compensation
law or of complying with the new Financial Responsibility Act.
It is, no doubt, too early to determine the final effect of the
passage of the new law. The first year of its existence, June 30,
1946, to June 30, 1947, has resulted in an increase of 4446-7 employers who have elected to come under the old law, but none
has elected to file with the Commissioner of Industrial Relations
the security called for under the new law It may well be, therefore, that it will stimulate enough employers to elect to come
under the old law to accomplish what a compulsory law would
accomplish, namely, provide adequate compensation for the
workers of the state injured in its industries.
If the Financial Responsibility Act does not meet the needs
of the State, it is believed, on the basis of the foregoing analysis,
that an adequate compensation law can be enacted under the
present constitution. It will be recalled that in the State Journal
case the Court of Appeals in the second opinion said that the law
was not invalid because, it was compulsory on the employer. It
said also that an employee could voluntarily surrender his right
to unlimited damages under section 54 of the constitution. If.
therefore, the Court should continue to adhere to its position
that a law supposedly compulsory on the employee was invalid.
the problem would be merely one of drafting a law that induced
the employee to accept its provisions.
It may well be questioned whether either the employer or
employee has any vested right in the common law rules. As was
pointed out above, the Court itself said in Greere v. Calidwell
m reference to the employer that he had no such vested right.
The employee would not seem to be in any different position
even if he challenged a compensation law passed in his own in" Id. 304 Ky at 863.
4'Annual Report of the Department of Industrial Relations, Fis-

cal Year July 1, 1946 to June 30, 1947.
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terests. The United States Supreme Court has sustained a number of admittedly compulsory compensation laws 48 when challenged by employers, and the same police power used to sustain
these laws from attacks by employers would no doubt sustain
them if attacked by employees. Certainly, the history of this typeof legislation in Kentucky furnishes no adequate legal grounds.
for the legislature's refraining from enacting such law-whether
compulsory or otherwise-as it considers the welfare of the
state requires.

'See N. Y. Central R. R. Co., v. White, 243 U. S. 188 (1916);
Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219 (1916).

